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INTRODUCTION 
Federal securities regulation presents a daunting challenge for 
those who are touched by it. The governing principles are myriad, 
complex, and can be ambiguous; the civil and criminal penalties for 
violations can be severe. Even where well intentioned, federal 
securities law can sweep broadly to ensnare even those who engage 
in legitimate practices. Insider trading law is one aspect of federal 
securities regulation that amply illustrates this point. The critical 
stakeholders in this area of the law are the federal government—in 
particular the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
the Department of Justice (DOJ)—and, on the receiving end of the 
law for purposes of this Article, the securities industry. 
This Article focuses on one form of insider trading law: “tippee” 
liability, which imposes liability on recipients of material non- 
public information (MNPI) who purchase or sell securities while in 
possession of such information.1  This area of insider trading law is 
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confusing and can lead to uncertain and often ambiguous outcomes. 
This is amply demonstrated by the current state of tippee liability 
law in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
This Article will center on two recent important cases for the 
government and the securities industry: United States v. Newman,2 
and United States v. Martoma (the Martoma cases).3 
These cases dealt with the personal benefit rule as a 
prerequisite for tippee liability in the “gift-giving” context involving 
“friends.”4 In a matter of three years, these cases, which involved 
similar fact patterns, reached divergent outcomes while relying 
largely on the same U.S. Supreme Court precedent to justify their 
core propositions.5 There is nothing particularly unusual about 
panels interpreting precedent differently—even panels in the same 
circuit. The Second Circuit’s struggles over where to draw the line 
between legal and illegal trading of MNPI within the framework of 
controlling Supreme Court precedent and its own contemporary 
case law, however, are particularly noteworthy. 
The objectives of this Article are modest. First, this Article will 
present and discuss the cases in such a way that the reader— 
especially law students—can get a good sense of how courts, even 
one as admired as the Second Circuit, can sometimes struggle when 
faced with ambiguous fact patterns and unclear statutory guidance. 
These cases are complex and intricate. Boiling them down to their 
essential components runs the inevitable risk of not doing them 
 
outside practice with two major law firms, and thirty years inside practice with 
a Fortune 300 company, Textron Inc., which he retired from as Deputy General 
Counsel & Assistant Secretary and head of the litigation group. Professor 
Spacone would like to acknowledge the invaluable comments and observations 
provided by Gregory Morvillo, Esq., a partner with Orrick, Herrington & 
Sutcliffe, many of which have been incorporated into this Article, and the 
significant editorial assistance provided by Carla Centanni, Roger Williams 
University School of Law Class of 2020, and member of the Roger Williams 
University Law Review. Any errors or omissions in this Article, however, are 
entirely to the account of Professor Spacone. 
1. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
2. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 
S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
3. United States v. Martoma (Martoma I), 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017), 
amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Martoma (Martoma 
II), 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017). 
4. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 67–68; Newman, 773 F.3d at 444. 
5. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 73–76 (applying Dirks, 463 U.S. 646); 
Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (applying Dirks, 463 U.S. 646). 
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justice. Hopefully sufficient information has been provided to offer 
insight into how and why the court grappled with the issue without 
detracting too much from, or obscuring, the doctrinal analysis. 
Central to the Second Circuit’s tribulations is the fact that 
there are no clear statutory guidelines as to what constitutes 
insider trading nor specific statutory language concerning how far 
the government should go with its enforcement powers.6 Congress 
has not spoken to these issues and the general language of section 
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) 
and its implementing regulation, SEC Rule 10b-5, do not provide a 
clear standard as to what activities constitute fraud or who the 
targets for such an inquiry should be.7 As one commentator aptly 
put it, it is up to the courts to determine the boundaries of insider 
trading by “bootstrap[ping] an interpretation of the law of insider 
trading up from other general legal concepts, particularly      fraud 
as it appears in many different legal contexts.”8 Inherently, this 
“allows” courts in the insider trading context to reach different 
results in cases involving essentially the same fact patterns, which 
occurred in the Second Circuit. Put another way, defining tippee 
insider trading brings to mind Justice Potter Stewart’s famous 
quote concerning obscenity: “I shall not today attempt further to 
define [obscenity] . . . [b]ut I know it when I see it . . . .”9  Of course, 
 
 
6. Kim Lane Scheppele, “It’s Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider 
Trading, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 126 (1993). Congress has never defined 
insider trading. However, in 2015, Senators Jack Reed (D) and Robert 
Menendez (D) introduced the “Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act.” S. 702, 114th 
Cong. (2015). The bill appears to have been in response to the narrowing of 
the evidence necessary to prove tippee liability in Newman. For a discussion 
of Newman, see infra section I.C. and II.A. Under the bill, it was irrelevant 
whether a trader knew the source of the required fiduciary duty or whether 
the source derived any personal benefit from tipping insider information.  See 
S. 702; see generally Reed & Menendez Introduce Bill to Clearly Define and Ban 
Unlawful Insider Trading, JACK REED: U.S. SENATOR FOR R.I. (Mar. 11, 2015), 
https://www.reed.senate.gov/news/releases/reed-and-menendez-introduce-bill- 
to-clearly-define-and-ban-unlawful-insider-trading [https://perma.cc/MY8G- 
D7N6]. The bill goes well beyond where the Second Circuit ended up in the 
Martoma cases. However, the bill did not gain any traction in Congress, and 
based on the Martoma cases, it is unlikely to pick up any steam. Further, the 
bill is poorly crafted and would create more problems for potential defendants 
than it ostensibly cures, but this is a subject for another time. 
7. See Scheppele, supra note 6, at 124. 
8. Id. 
9. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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the Supreme Court “defined” obscenity, albeit with a subjective 
standard, but like the Second Circuit’s efforts to define tippee 
insider trading, struggled to get there.10 
Second, this Article will discuss how the two Second Circuit 
panels approached the issue of tippee liability as a means of better 
understanding the outcomes and providing a basis for the 
implications for future tippee liability cases in the Circuit. The 
conclusion that this article reaches is hardly earth shattering: the 
Newman court and the dissents in the Martoma cases took a narrow 
view of the personal benefit rule in the gift-giving context.11 On the 
other hand, the majority in the Martoma cases approached tippee 
insider trading liability broadly.12 Put simply, the former approach 
led to a favorable rule for the securities industry; the latter a highly 
favorable rule for the government. In the final analysis, it is no 
more complicated than this. How the panels reached their ultimate 
conclusions lay at the heart of this Article. 
This Article will not analyze which case was doctrinally correct. 
Frankly, the answer of who got it “right” is best left to others, and 
neither case is entirely satisfying from a doctrinal perspective. 
Moreover, this Article is not a brief in support of open borders on 
insider trading. 
Also, this Article will not pass judgment on the government’s 
position on tippee liability other than to state that its approach as 
reflected in these cases is consistent with its general view that 
federal securities law should be interpreted broadly to protect 
investors. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Introduction to Insider Trading 
Insider trading involves the purchase or sale of a security for 
personal gain on the basis of awareness, while in possession of 
MNPI concerning the issuer of the security in breach of a duty of 
confidentiality and trust owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively to 
the issuer of the security (e.g., a corporation), the shareholders of 
 
10. See Scheppele, supra note 6, at 123–24. 
11. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2017) (Pooler, J., 
dissenting); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014), 
abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
12. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 73–74. 
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the issuer, or any other person who is the source of the MNPI.13 
The personal gain may be either a profit or avoidance of a loss.14 
Holding a security while in possession of MNPI is not insider 
trading.15 The heart of insider trading is the breach of a duty of 
confidentiality with respect to the MNPI. This area presents the 
most complex interpretive issues.16 
Insider trading is unfair because the person in possession of 
the MNPI has a significant trading advantage over other persons 
who do not have the information.17 As will be discussed more fully 
below, the mere possession of MNPI as a basis for trading does not 
necessarily constitute fraud.18 Indeed, the central issue in 
Newman and the Martoma cases was where to draw the line 
between legal and illegal use of MNPI by recipients of the 
information in the context of the securities industry, which thrives 
on asymmetry of information.19 Simply put, insider trading is 
illegal. However, not all sharing of, and trading on, MNPI by 
recipients of the information is insider trading.20 
A person in possession of MNPI has a duty of confidentiality 
with respect to that information and has two options to avoid 
prosecution for insider trading: either do not trade on the 
information, or “make appropriate disclosures”—i.e., make it 
sufficiently public—ahead of time.21 The critical question at the 
center of Newman and the Martoma cases was when does a person 
have a duty of confidentiality? 
The Supreme Court has adopted three theories of insider 
trading to capture “insiders.” The classical theory deals with 
“actual” insiders,22 and the “misappropriation” theory deals with 
 
13. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2000) for the SEC’s definition of insider 
trading, which includes tipper-tippee liability. 
14. See generally id. 
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a). This section requires that insider trading 
law applies only when there has been a “purchase or sale” of security. Id. 
16. See id. 
17. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 673 (1983) (quoting In re Cady, Roberts 
& Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 912 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
18. See § 240.10b5-1(b). 
19. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. 
Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 450 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United 
States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
20. See § 240.10b5-1(b). 
21. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651. 
22. Generally, when people discuss the classical view of insider trading, 
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“outsiders” who misappropriate MNPI and trade on it.23 The law 
is reasonably stable in these areas. 
The third theory of insider trading is tippee liability.24 When 
a person (tippee) purchases or sells a security for personal gain 
while in possession of MNPI received directly or indirectly from an 
insider (tipper) in breach of a duty of confidentiality, the tippee may 
be liable for insider trading.25 The tipper also may be guilty of 
insider trading irrespective of whether he or she trades on the 
MNPI, but this is of secondary importance here.26 As discussed, 
drawing the lines for tippee insider trading can be challenging. 
It is important to understand that the term “securities” is 
expansive and includes many types of securities.27 As such, insider 
trading violations can involve any type of security. The cases 
discussed in this article involve trading in public company common 
equity shares, which dominate most insider trading cases. 
Although insider trading is not limited to shares of public 
companies that trade on national exchanges, such as the New York 
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, almost all the cases arise in this 
context. The SEC can easily access trading activity on national 
exchanges. Further, the SEC is charged with the oversight, 
administration, and enforcement of federal securities laws.28 The 
SEC pays particular attention to “unusual” trading activity in 
proximity to material corporate events such as mergers or earnings 
announcements, each of which can move share price up or down. In 
other words, the SEC works backwards from circumstantial 
evidence.29 The detection mechanisms available to the SEC and 
 
they point to Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (setting forth the 
classical view parameters of insider trading). 
23. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649–50 (1997) 
(establishing the misappropriation theory of insider trading); see generally 
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (originally crafting the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading). 
24. See Dirks, 463 U.S at 647. 
25. Id. at 662. 
26. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 75 (citations omitted). 
27. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). This section of the United States 
Code codifies the Exchange Act, which set forth the definition of what 
constitutes a security. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10), the section of the 
Exchange Act which contains essentially the same “list” of securities. 
28. What We Do, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 10, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/RQ37-VSSJ]. 
29. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES AND REGULATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 942 (7th ed. 2017). 
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market participants, such as national exchanges and broker- 
dealers, cannot catch all indicia of potential insider trading, but 
they are sufficiently robust to have a meaningful deterrence effect. 
Detection is an important enforcement tool because there is good 
evidence that sanctions alone do not deter insider trading.30 
If the SEC’s suspicions are aroused, it has broad authority 
under the Exchange Act to commence an investigation into insider 
trading, including issuing subpoenas and taking depositions.31 For 
those who engage in suspected insider trading, phone records, 
emails and statements from persons lower on the “food chain” who 
are promised immunity often provide ample evidence to support 
prosecution. Targets of insider trading investigations often make 
their lives worse by lying to investigators or otherwise unlawfully 
interfering with an investigation, thereby facilitating an 
obstruction of justice charge tacked on to insider trading charges. 
One would think that sophisticated investors who engage in 
insider trading would be aware of the SEC’s detection prowess and 
ability to ferret out damning information, especially improvident 
emails, as well as the need to be honest when talking to 
investigators. This does not appear to be the case for many who 
engage in insider trading; or perhaps they simply suffer from the 
hubris of thinking that they are too smart to be caught or that when 
caught, they can outsmart the government. 
Insider trading cases rarely catch the imagination of the public, 
other than to reinforce the widely held view that Wall Street is 
inherently venal. Recently, however, the indictment of New York 
Congressman Christopher Collins (and others) for violating federal 
insider trading laws piqued the public’s interest.32 Collins is the 
alleged tipper, and his son and father-in-law are the alleged 
tippees.33 The government claims that the two defendant tippees 
sold stock in a biotechnology company while in possession of MNPI 
 
30. Id. The authors discussed this point and offered references to an 
article to support the proposition. It is a maxim of behavioral science, however, 
that, for many, absent detection, the mere potential of sanctions is not 
efficacious from an enforcement perspective. 
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1). 
32. See Alan Feuer & Shane Golmacher, New York Congressman Chris 
Collins Is Charged With Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/nyregion/chris-collins-insider- 
trading.html [https://perma.cc/GMC5-TGPK]. 
33. Id. 
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concerning a failed drug trial.34 Collins shared the information 
with his son, who then passed it on to his future father-in-law and 
others.35 The two named tippees—and several others who were not 
named  in  the  indictment—used  the  information  to  avoid  over 
$700,000 in losses.36 Collins was prohibited from selling his stock 
because he sat on the company’s board, but this is scant consolation 
under the scheme liability theory of insider trading.37 Whether the 
government will prevail remains to be seen, but the Collins 
indictment is a classic example of tipper-tippee liability. 
B. Introduction to Newman and the Martoma Cases 
Newman and the Martoma cases focused on determining the 
level of evidence necessary for a fact finder to infer that the tipper 
received a personal benefit as a requirement to establish the duty 
of confidentiality. Newman and the dissents in the Martoma cases 
advocated an objective evidentiary standard as a means to limit 
overbroad application of tippee insider trading law in the context of 
gift-giving to so-called “friends.”38 The majorities in the Martoma 
cases opted for a subjective standard, which reflected an expansive 
view of tippee liability law in this context.39 Each tethered their 
opinions to the seminal case on tipper-tippee liability, Dirks v. SEC, 
but as discussed, reached widely divergent outcomes.40 The 
contours of tippee insider trading law in the Second Circuit are 
important because a high volume of cases, including many of high 
profile prosecutions, are litigated in the courts of the Southern 
District of New York. As such, the Second Circuit has become a 
leading appeals court, if not the leader, for insider trading law, 
subject of course, to cases that make their way to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which has occurred only once in the last almost twenty 
 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. There were several other individuals who also used the information 
but were not named in the indictment. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 80 (2d Cir. 2017) (Pooler, J., dissenting); see 
also United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that 
an objective standard is needed to establish the personal benefit requirement), 
abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
39. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 76. 
40. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
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years.41 
Prior to Newman, the law of insider trading regarding tippee 
liability in the Second Circuit had been relatively stable and highly 
favorable to the government. The United States Attorney’s Office 
had a long history of successful criminal prosecutions of insider 
trading cases in the Circuit. Newman upset the status quo, 
breaking a string of successful insider trading cases prosecuted by 
the United States Attorney.42 Martoma II restored most, if not all, 
of what Newman took away from the government on the personal 
benefit rule.43 
Trading on MNPI for personal benefit may be a violation of 
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and SEC Rule 10b-5.44 In short, 
these anti-fraud provisions prohibit any fraud or deceptive 
practices in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.45 
The essence of insider trading is that it involves fraudulent conduct 
and thus constitutes a violation of these provisions. As discussed, 
violators face harsh civil penalties46—i.e. up to three times the 
profit or loss avoided—and criminal penalties, including 
incarceration for up to twenty years, not to mention the significant 
costs associated with defending against government proceedings.47 
They also face serious reputational risks, which can have a major 
impact on their businesses and future employment prospects. 
Summing up to this point, there are no clear statutory 
guidelines for what constitutes insider trading. The underlying 
provisions that prohibit insider trading are general, yet violations 
of insider trading law can have harsh consequences including 
 
 
41. Nate Raymond, NY Insider Trading Ruling Tests Prosecutors beyond 
Wall Street, REUTERS: BUS. NEWS (Jan. 26, 2015, 7:05 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-insidertrading-analysis/ny-insider- 
trading-ruling-tests-prosecutors-beyond-wall-street- 
idUSKBN0KZ17W20150126 [https://perma.cc/2F6Z-B44P]. 
42. Ronak V. Patel & Toby M. Galloway, Tippee Insider Trading after 
Newman and Salman: Why Knowledge Is Not Always Your Friend, WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME COMM. NEWSL. (ABA), Jan. 2017, at 3. 
43. See generally Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 75 (2d Cir. 2017). 
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (section 10(b) of the Exchange Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b- 
5 (SEC Rule 10b-5). 
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Both of these speak in terms of 
the requisite fraud occurring in connection with the “purchase or sale of any 
security.” 
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1. 
47. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78ff. 
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criminal penalties. It is axiomatic that the broader insider trading 
law is, the more people will be subject to harsh civil and criminal 
penalties, not to mention heavy costs to defend themselves if they 
are named in a government proceeding. As will be discussed 
presently, the unfairness of insider trading is another important 
dimension that influences the development of insider trading law. 
The SEC has the power to bring civil enforcement actions for 
insider trading violations under section 10(b)/rule 10b-5.48 The 
SEC may initiate civil proceedings in an administrative law court, 
depending on the target, or in a United States federal district 
court.49 Criminal prosecutions may be brought in federal district 
court only by the DOJ either independently or by referral from the 
SEC.50 While private suits are permitted under section 20(a) of the 
Exchange Act they are uncommon for reasons beyond the scope of 
this Article.51 
Ultimately, the contours of insider trading law reside with the 
courts. Most insider trading cases, at least the high-profile cases, 
involve criminal prosecutions. This is important because in 
calculating the limits of tippee liability law, one would hope that 
the courts are cognizant of the consequences arising from the limits 
they draw or do not draw. 
The SEC, ostensibly, has considerable discretion under the 
“Chevron doctrine” to enact rules to implement section 10(b).52 The 
SEC has defined insider trading in rule 10b-5-1.53 The rule states 
 
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
49. How Investigations Work, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 
27, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/enforce/how-investigations-work.html 
[https://perma.cc/6LUN-66CJ]. 
50. See Securities Subcommittee of the White Collar Criminal Litig. Comm., 
Criminal Prosecutorial Discretion in Insider Trading Cases: Let’s Look at the
 Numbers, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N 1 (May 12, 2010), 
https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Commercial_Federal_Litigation/ComFed_Dis 
play_Tabs/Reports/CRIMINALPROSECUTORIALDISCRETIONINTHEINSI 
DERTRADINGCASES_pdf.html [https://perma.cc/U486-8P57]. 
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1. 
52. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In this 
landmark case, the Supreme Court sustained the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s interpretation of a provision in the Clean Air Act holding in the 
process that the courts should defer to executive agency interpretation of the 
laws they administer provided the law is ambiguous and the interpretation 
reasonable. Id. The Court traced this power to Congress’ authorization of 
agency rule making. Id. 
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5-1. 
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that the law of insider trading is “otherwise defined by judicial 
opinions,” which is the SEC’s way of saying that it has the power to 
define insider trading law as well.54 Furthermore, under the 
Chevron doctrine, the SEC’s position is that its interpretation of the 
law should be given deference by the courts.55 
Importantly, the government is afforded wide discretion to 
bring insider trading enforcement proceedings and aggressively 
urges its view on the courts, even those views, which the court 
previously rejected. The courts do not always embrace the SEC’s 
view of insider trading law, as Dirks, Newman, and other cases 
reveal.56 As will be discussed below, Dirks and Newman sought to 
limit the reach of insider trading law because of the serious 
consequences for certain information sharing activity that merit 
protection from the reach of insider trading law. 
The animus behind insider trading law is that the practice is 
fundamentally unfair to shareholders who do not have the 
information and thus miss the opportunity to make gains or trim 
losses through trading.57 This represents an asymmetry of 
information between those who have the information and those who 
do not. Various plausible market efficiency and transparency 
arguments have been made against regulating insider trading, but, 
as far as the SEC is concerned, they are not strong enough to 
outweigh the fundamental unfairness of the conduct.58 
The unfairness aspect of insider trading drives government 
enforcement actions under section 10(b)/rule 10b-5. Insider trading 
runs counter to the SEC’s mandate to protect investors and ensure 
 
 
54. Id. 
55. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
56. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); United States v. 
Newman, 773 F.3d. 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 
137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
57. See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 
40 SEC Docket 907, 912 (1961). Cady, Roberts is the seminal case on the 
application of section 10(b) to market trading transactions. That decision was 
premised on the fundamental unfairness of insider trading and the need to 
regulate it under the anti-fraud statute. See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8459, 43 SEC Docket 933, 936 (Nov. 
25, 1968). Fraud in an insider trading case derives from “inherent unfairness 
involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is 
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.” Cady, Roberts, 40 SEC Docket 
at 912. 
58. See COX ET AL., supra note 29, at 906. 
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the integrity and fairness of markets where they trade.59 Because 
the SEC believes that insider trading undermines investor 
confidence in the integrity and fairness of securities markets, 
detecting and prosecuting insider trading violations is one of the 
SEC’s enforcement priorities.60 To put it bluntly, the Agency hates 
insider trading and its track record in prosecuting such actions is 
formidable, although there has been at least one notable exception 
recently in addition to Newman.61 Merely being the subject of an 
insider trading investigation can cost one dearly as the professional 
golfer Phil Mickelson recently found out.62 
C. The Securities Industry 
It is important to briefly discuss how the securities industry 
obtains and uses information concerning issuers because the 
industry was front and center in Newman and in the Martoma 
cases.63 Indeed, the securities industry is especially susceptible to 
 
 
59. What We Do, supra note 28. 
60. Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/general- 
resources/glossary/insider-trading [https://perma.cc/3TWQ-G2BJ] (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2018). 
61. See, e.g., SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009). Yes, 
this is the Mark Cuban. He prevailed at trial on the duty issue. Purportedly, 
he said at a law school forum, “If you got resources, fight ‘em,” referring to the 
SEC, “because they’re not that smart.” Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., What Elon 
Can Learn from Mark Cuban About Fighting the SEC, WALL STREET JOURNAL: 
BUSINESS WORLD (Aug. 24, 2018, 6:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what- 
elon-can-learn-from-mark-cuban-about-fighting-the-sec-1535149910 
[https://perma.cc/D66Q-2PHU]. We do not have time for this here, but it is 
doubtful that Elon Musk is in pari delicto so to speak with Cuban but he 
certainly has the funds and insurance to fight the SEC if it decides to go after 
him for his infamous twit on Tesla going private. 
62. Patel & Galloway, supra note 42, at 7–8. Michelson was named as a 
so-called “relief defendant” in a criminal complaint filed against the tipper of 
the MNPI and tippee. The tippee defendant passed on the confidential 
information to Mickelson who traded on it. Perhaps mindful of Newman’s 
knowledge requirement, the government decided not to criminally charge 
Mickelson as a remote tippee. He ended up, however, disgorging the 
approximately $930,000 profit he made from the trade plus interest. No doubt, 
he paid his lawyers a handsome fee as well. Perhaps, he should have sought 
Mark Cuban’s counsel. Although, given what was at stake, Mickelson appears 
to have made the right decision. 
63. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2017); Martoma I, 869 F.3d 58 
(2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. 
Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 
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insider trading violations. Market analysts, financial reporters, 
traders, and investment advisors hunger for important economic 
information to derive revenues or profits for their firms and on 
occasion, for themselves. As such, they relentlessly employ a 
variety of methods and tools not available to most of the general 
investing public to ascertain and analyze information that they can 
pass on to their investor clients for potential trading purposes. 
Often, securities professionals, especially market analysis, make 
provident trading decisions for their firms, as is the case with 
traders. Often market analysts will have direct communications 
with insiders, such as investor relations personnel, to further their 
information gathering, albeit ostensibly in compliance with the 
federal securities laws. Further, market analysts and traders often 
share information, especially when they work for the same 
brokerage firm. 
At the risk of simplification, the foregoing discussion can be 
summarized as such: the securities industry thrives on important 
economic information concerning issuers, and the sooner it can get 
the information and the more reliable the information, the better. 
This is a powerful motivating force that can lead to insider trading. 
There is nothing inherently illegal concerning market 
professionals’ search for information, or the selective use of that 
information for their clients or firms. As the Supreme Court stated, 
“[i]t is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the 
markets themselves, that such information cannot be 
simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s stockholders or 
the public generally.”64 Again, it is not necessarily illegal for an 
investor or securities professional to obtain critical economic 
information concerning a corporation. Moreover, in such 
circumstances, an insider might disclose MNPI that ends up in an 
investor’s hand inadvertently or without the intent that it be a 
“gift.”65 
The SEC acknowledges and encourages the flow of important 
economic information from market analysts to investors because it 
is important to the latter’s investment decisions, and is thus 
 
 
 
137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
64. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
65. See id. 
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necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.66 The analysis, 
for purposes of insider trading violations, gets complicated, as was 
the case in Newman and the Martoma cases, when MNPI enters 
the picture, especially for traders who extract profits or avoid losses 
for their firms based on the information. 
Sorting out who is engaging in insider trading and who is not 
is a challenge because, depending on the governing rules, all or 
some of the involved persons may be caught in the government’s 
enforcement net. Moreover, broad application of insider trading 
law, or at least the threat of it, can chill legitimate market 
communications. Equally important is that members of the 
securities industry need to order their professional lives around the 
rules that govern insider trading and face the consequences if they 
violate them. Understanding the rules is of paramount importance, 
or at least should be. 
On the opposite side of the equation is the SEC. The SEC 
would agree that “certainty” surrounding insider trading law is a 
good thing, and it even encourages the free flow of information to 
the market. The SEC and many securities professionals diverge on 
whether insider trading law should be narrow or broad. Certainly, 
the two views are divergent, and the outcome is important to each 
stakeholder. Tellingly, in Dirks, the Supreme Court granted a writ 
of certiorari to address the issue of tippee liability because of its 
“importance to the SEC and to the securities industry.”67 
II. THE DUTY OF TRUST AND CONFIDENTIALITY (DUTY OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY) AND THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S “EXCEPTION” 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the heart of any 
insider trading case, including tippee insider trading, is a breach of 
the duty of confidentiality.68 In other words, the duty arises from 
the fiduciary relationship between the insider and the corporation, 
its shareholders, and others.69 This is an extrapolation of the 
common law of fiduciary duty. The breach of the duty of 
confidentiality is the fraudulent conduct that triggers a section 
 
66. See id. at 658. 
67. Id. at 652. 
68. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC 
Docket 907, 912 (Nov. 8, 1961); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222, 227 (1996). 
69. See Cady, Roberts, 40 SEC Docket at 911. 
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10(b)/rule 10b-5 violation.70 
By requiring a duty of confidentiality as a prerequisite to an 
insider trading violation, the Supreme Court imposed a limitation 
on what constitutes insider trading.71 Without this limit, section 
10(b) and rule 10b-5 could be interpreted in the extreme resulting 
in a violation for any trading of MNPI. For example, if a passerby 
finds a confidential memorandum concerning a merger that fell out 
of a CEO’s brief case, she is free to trade on it. She has no duty to 
the corporation; she has committed no fraud. If a thief breaks into 
an office building, steals the same information and trades on it, he 
breaches no duty to the corporation and is thus free to trade on the 
information, although he is certainly guilty of theft. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has held that there is no general duty between 
participants in market transactions to forego actions based on 
MNPI.72 
Interestingly, in SEC v. Dorozhko, the Second Circuit 
sanctioned the application of insider trading law in the context of 
cybercrimes and computer hacking, in the absence of a duty of 
confidentiality that involved a “misrepresentation.”73 The hackers 
traded on an earnings report that they accessed from the issuer’s 
computer system before the report was made public.74 The district 
court rejected the defense’s argument that the SEC needed to prove 
a breach of the duty of confidentially, stating that “[t]o eliminate 
the fiduciary duty requirement now would be to undo decades of 
Supreme Court precedent, and rewrite the law as it has been 
developed.”75 The Second Circuit accepted the argument on appeal 
and sent the case back to the trial court for further consideration 
based on its ruling.76 In short, the court reasoned that if the 
 
70. See id. 
71. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (“[N]ot every instance of financial unfairness 
constitutes fraudulent activity under section 10(b) ....... ”); see also Dirks v. SEC, 
463 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1983). 
72. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654. 
73. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). For an excellent 
discussion of this interesting case, which I drew on for this Article, see Brittney 
Pagliarini, Inside-Out: The Erosion and Evolution of the Fiduciary Duty 
Principle in Insider Trading Cases (May 2017) (unpublished student paper, 
Roger Williams Univ.) (on file with the author). 
74. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654. 
75. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 
574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). 
76. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 48. 
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defendant’s conduct involved gaining access to the corporation’s 
computer system through affirmative misrepresentation of one’s 
identity, as opposed to discovering weaknesses in the computer 
software, that constituted a deceptive or fraudulent practice under 
section 10(b).77 As such, the conduct was actionable as insider 
trading because the MNPI was the basis for the subsequent 
trading.78 The court’s decision is notable because it did not mention 
rule 10b-5, and instead analogized a violation of section 10(b) to 
common law fraud to support its holding.79 Frankly, the case 
appears to be more of a misrepresentation case than an insider 
trading case, which makes it all the more more confusing. 
One way to view Dorozhko is that it created a fourth judicial 
theory for insider trading—the “affirmative misappropriation 
theory.”80 However, the case was widely criticized,81 and has not 
gained any traction outside the Circuit.82 The most notable aspect 
of the decision for purposes of this Article is that while the court’s 
reasoning is defensible on its own terms, the Second Circuit 
appears to have gone “out of its way” to accommodate the SEC’s 
expansive view of insider trading, which decidedly was not the case 
in Newman, but certainly was in the Martoma cases.83 In this 
broad sense, it appears that the Martoma cases are more consistent 
with the Second Circuit’s general view of insider trading law than 
Newman.84 
 
77. Id. at 49. 
78. See id. at 51. 
79. Id. at 46. 
80. See generally Ryan Gilinson, Clicks and Tricks: How Computer 
Hackers Avoid 10b-5 Liability, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1305, 1308–09 (2017). 
81. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, The Second Circuit’s Egregious Decision 
in SEC v. Dorozhko, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM    (July 29, 2009), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/07/the- 
second-circuits-recent-decision-in-sec-v-dorozhko-available-here-dealt-with- 
one-of-the-questions-left-open-by-the.html [https://perma.cc/6D9R-WWM4]. 
Professor Bainbridge faults the Second Circuit for “finessing” the insider 
trading rules by treating the case as one of misrepresentation rather than 
insider trading. Id. He has a point. 
82. James A. Jones II, Outsider Hacking and Insider Trading: The 
Expansion of Liability Absent a Fiduciary Duty, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 
111, 119–21 (2010). 
83. See Martoma I, 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d 
Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d. 438 (2d Cir. 2014), 
abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
84. See Martoma I, 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d 
Cir. 2017); see also Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman 
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As discussed, insider trading analysis becomes more 
complicated when an insider tipper intentionally shares MNPI with 
another person, the tippee, who trades on it, or passes it on to 
another person who trades on it (remote tippee).85 If an essential 
element of insider trading is a breach of confidentiality then, absent 
a duty, the tippee is free to trade on the information because he or 
she has no duty to the corporation or its shareholders. There is no 
fraud. Clearly, the tippee has an unfair advantage compared to 
investors who do not have the information. However, unfairness in 
and of itself is not fraud, irrespective of how egregious it might be. 
If unfairness were the touchstone of a section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 
violation, then capital formation in the United States would be 
seriously impaired. Here is where Dirks enters the picture with its 
“exportation” of the insider’s duty of confidentiality to the tippee. 
III. DEFINING TIPPEE LIABILITY: DIRKS, TO NEWMAN, TO SALMAN 
A. Dirks: The Personal Benefit Rule Emerges 
The Dirks Court sought to address the duty gap in the context 
of tippee liability and provide clarity and guidance, especially in the 
context of security industry practices. In the process, the Court 
made it clear that trading on MNPI, without more, was not illegal, 
which was consistent with prior pronouncements.86 Moreover, 
Justice Louis Powell, writing for the majority, sought to establish a 
rule that did not unduly infringe on legitimate practices in the 
securities industry.87 
The defendant in Dirks was an officer of a brokerage firm that 
specialized in providing investment advice to institutional investors 
concerning insurance company securities.88 A former officer of a 
public insurance company provided Dirks with information 
concerning fraudulent practices by the company.89 The former 
insider urged Dirks to investigate the fraudulent conduct that led 
to massive misrepresentation of the company’s assets and expose 
 
 
v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
85. Patel & Galloway, supra note 42, at 1–5. 
86. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983). 
87. Id. at 658. 
88.  Id.  at  648. 
89. Id. at 648–49. 
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the fraud publicly, which he did.90 Neither the former insider nor 
Dirks traded on the information, but Dirks discussed it with a 
number of his clients and investors. Some of those clients and 
investors traded on the information, thus avoiding losses that 
ensued once the fraudulent information became public and the 
company’s share price dropped precipitously.91 The SEC’s theory 
of the case was that once Dirks received the MNPI, he had an 
obligation not to disclose it to the investment community who later 
sold their stock, regardless of his motivation or occupation.92 The 
SEC was arguing for a “parity of information” standard.93 In other 
words, the focus should be on anyone who trades or tips, not the 
tipper.94 
In a civil prosecution, Dirks was censured by the SEC after an 
administrative law court found him guilty of aiding and abetting 
illegal insider trading and in violation of section 10(b)/rule 10b-5.95 
The case eventually made its way to the United States Supreme 
Court.96 In a six to three decision, the Court reversed the court of 
appeals, holding that the insider did not violate his duty to the 
corporation because he received no monetary or personal benefit 
from revealing the information, and the disclosure was not intended 
as a gift.97 In the absence of a breach of duty by the insider, there 
was no “derivative” breach by Dirks.98 
Central to the Court’s reasoning was that the tippee assumes 
the insider’s duty of confidentiality by participating in the breach; 
in other words, by participating in the fraudulent scheme. For the 
tippee, the duty is derivative of the insider’s duty. Hence, the fraud 
is necessary to trigger section 10(b)/rule 10b-5-1. In a footnote, the 
 
 
90. Id. at 649. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 651. 
93. Jon Eisenberg, How United States v. Newman Changes the Law, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG.: BLOGROLL (May 3, 2015), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/05/03/how-united-states-v-newman- 
changes-the-law/ [https://perma.cc/QLR9-6BFE]. Eisenberg’s discussion of 
Dirks and Newman is very insightful and was relied on heavily for this Article 
in this regard. 
94. Id. 
95. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 459 U.S. 
1014 (Nov. 15, 1982) (No. 82-276). 
96. Id. 
97. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 646 (1983). 
98. Id. at 667. 
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majority acknowledged the important role that Dirks played in 
bringing important information to investors that they otherwise 
might not have received.99 Dirks’ efforts where analogized to the 
role market analysts play in communicating important information 
to the market. In the eyes of Justice Powell, Dirks was merely doing 
what any good analyst would do.100 Hence, the need to confine 
tippee liability law to protect market analysts and other securities 
professionals who are involved in the exchange of information from 
judicial over reach. 
The Court established a two-prong requirement for which a 
jury could infer an insider trading violation when tippers and 
tippees were involved.101 The tipper must have derived a direct or 
indirect personal benefit from the divulged information and, the 
Court explained, in dicta, the tippee must have had knowledge of 
the personal benefit associated with the exchange of the 
information.102 The Newman court would run with both of these 
requirements. 
It is the personal benefit rule in the gift-giving context among 
friends that stands at the center of Newman and the Martoma 
cases. In Dirks, the central focus was on the benefit received by the 
insider tipper, not whether the tippee received a benefit. This is a 
critical distinction because Newman fully embraced this principle 
whereas the courts in the Martoma cases focused on the benefit to 
the tippee, which entails a lesser evidentiary standard.103 
In Dirks, the Court expressly identified personal benefits to 
include a relationship that suggests a quid pro quo arrangement, 
financial or otherwise, between the tipper and tippee, or a gift of 
MNPI to a trading relative or friend, where the tip and trade 
resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of 
proceeds to the recipient.104 Interestingly, the Court did not 
discuss how clear the relationship needed to be, although arguably 
the tenor of the decision pointed in this direction. 
 
 
99.    Id. at 652 n.8. 
100.    Id. at 658–59. 
101.    Id. at 665. 
102.    Id. at 662. 
103. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Newman, 
773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated by Salman v. United States, 137 S. 
Ct. 420 (2016). 
104. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
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By providing the government with alternative bases to 
prosecute tippee liability cases, Dirks hardly foreclosed government 
prosecutions. For example, proving a quid pro quo arrangement, 
which is arguably the most visible and pernicious form of insider 
trading, is relatively straightforward: Did the tipper receive money 
from the tippee in exchange for the MNPI? However, proving 
personal benefit in the gift-giving context is more difficult because 
it involves ambiguous fact patterns. 
In introducing the personal benefit rule in Dirks, the Court 
sought a “guiding principle” for those market participants whose 
daily activities were limited and instructed by the SEC’s insider 
trading rules.105 The Court characterized the rule adopted by the 
SEC as having “no limiting principle.”106 The Court went on to note 
that the question of whether an insider personally benefited from 
disclosure would be based on “objective criteria,” rather than 
reading the parties’ minds to justify an inference that the insider 
received a personal benefit.107 The court in Newman interpreted 
this to require evidence of a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship.”108 
In short, the Dirks Court erected a limiting principle in an 
attempt to mitigate against the inherent ambiguity and subjectivity 
surrounding the determination of what constitutes a personal 
benefit, not to mention other elements associated with proving 
illegal insider trading.109 This “limiting principle” of Dirks figures 
prominently in Newman and Martoma II, although the Second 
Circuit had opposing views on the matter. 
The Court’s concern that insider trading law could sweep too 
broadly to ensnare or deter market professionals who were 
performing an important market function is understandable. In 
this sense, Dirks was all about “policing insiders and what they  
do . . . rather than policing information per se and its possession . . . 
.”110 At the same time, the Court recognized that there was a clear 
need for a ban on some tippee trading.111   In effect, by establishing 
 
105.   Id. 
106.   Id. 
107. Id. at 663. 
108. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated 
by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
109. Eisenberg, supra note 93. 
110. Id. 
111. Dirks, 473 U.S. at 659. 
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the personal benefit rule, the Court sought to thread the needle by 
better defining tippee liability, while containing it at the same time. 
B. Newman’s Gloss on the Personal Benefit Rule 
For many years Dirks was considered settled law. Starting in 
2008, the SEC and the DOJ stepped up prosecutions of insider 
trading cases.112 As discussed previously, the United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York had a string of 
eighty successful convictions.113 Simultaneously, the government 
was aggressively investigating several hedge funds suspected of 
insider trading, with increased focus on remote tippees; that is, 
tippees that were one or more levels removed from the original 
tipper-tippee.114 Then came Newman, and the personal benefit 
landscape changed dramatically. 
Newman involved the criminal conviction of two portfolio 
managers, Newman and Chiasson, who traded on inside 
information passed on by market professionals who received the 
information from two corporate insiders.115 The prosecution was 
complicated because the defendants were “remote” tippees.116 The 
players in this saga were characterized by the court as 
“acquaintances.”117 There was no evidence of any pecuniary or 
similar gain associated with the original exchange of the 
information by the corporate insiders, or that the defendants knew 
who originally shared the information, let alone whether it was for 
a personal benefit.118 
The government argued that it was required to prove that the 
defendants traded on MNPI that they knew insiders disclosed in a 
breach of a duty of confidentiality.119 This is how the government 
read Dirks. The jury instructions essentially mirrored the 
government’s position and the defendants were convicted on this 
basis.120 
 
112. Patel & Galloway, supra note 42, at 3. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Raymond, supra note 41. 
116. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014), abrogated 
by Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
117.    Id. at 448. 
118.    Id. at 453. 
119.  Id. at 453. 
120. Id. at 445–46. 
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On appeal, the Newman court reversed the convictions.121 
Relying heavily on its understanding of Dirks’ limiting principle, it 
found the jury instructions wanting and held that, under the 
personal benefit rule, for a factfinder to infer a benefit in the context 
of gift-giving, there must be proof of a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, 
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a 
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”122 The court held that 
there was insufficient evidence in this regard, and reversed the 
convictions on this basis as well as another, which is discussed 
below.123 
In short, the court concluded that the government could not 
satisfy the personal benefit requirement of Dirks by producing 
evidence of a mere “casual or social nature.”124 The court also 
rejected the idea that mere gift-giving would be sufficient for a jury 
to infer a personal benefit.125 It is important to understand that 
central to the court’s holding was that, in its mind, the government 
was advancing a novel view of insider trading law that sought to 
reach remote tippees, which the court considered contrary to 
Dirks.126 In this regard, the court noted that in prior cases, tippees 
that were as remote as Newman and Chiasson had never been 
criminally liable for insider trading.127 
Interestingly, the gloss Newman put on the Dirks personal 
benefit rule was not the main holding of the case.128 Specifically, 
Dirks’ knowledge of the personal benefit requirement was the main 
focus of the appellants’ argument.129 A reading of the portion of the 
opinion that addresses this issue hardly presages where the court 
finally came out. Somewhat of an exaggeration, but the pecuniary 
relationship or similar nature requirement appeared largely out of 
nowhere. It certainly was not mentioned in Dirks. 
In any event, the court also reversed echoing Dirks on the 
 
121.    Id. at 444. 
122.    Id. at 452. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. See id. 
126. Id. at 448. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 452. 
129. Telephone Interview with Gregory Morvillo, Partner, Orrick, 
Herrington & Sutcliffe (Sept. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Morvillo Interview]. 
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ground that there was insufficient evidence that the defendants 
knew that the original tippers received a personal benefit.130 The 
appellants argued that the jury must find that they knew that the 
MNPI had been disclosed for a personal benefit.131 The court, 
expanding on the dicta in Dirks, agreed with the appellants and 
spent a considerable amount of time discussing the issue.132 The 
subsequent case law discussed in this Article leaves this leg of 
Newman untouched, and thus there is no virtue in further delving 
into the court’s thinking there, other than to point out that the 
Dirks knowledge requirement, which was elaborated on in 
Newman, remains very much alive in the Second Circuit—at least 
for now. 
Newman was controversial for at least two reasons. The 
phrase “meaningfully close personal relationship” does not appear 
in Dirks, and according to the majority in Martoma II, the phrase 
was “new to our insider trading jurisprudence.”133 In fairness to 
the Newman court, Dirks arguably allowed for such an 
extrapolation by requiring “objective” evidence to support the 
personal benefit inquiry. The Newman court merely defined more 
concretely what the government needed to prove to establish the 
friend relationship. 
More problematic from a doctrinal perspective, the Newman 
court went well beyond Dirks by requiring the government to prove 
that the tipper received something of a pecuniary or similarly 
valuable nature from the exchange of information.134 A fair reading 
of Dirks is that a gift may include something of monetary or similar 
nature, but this is not the only indicia of what constitutes a gift— 
let alone what constitutes a personal benefit. As discussed, Dirks 
provided the government with alternatives to prove personal 
benefit.135 In the gift-giving context, Newman took away one of 
those options by imposing the pecuniary or of similar nature 
requirement.136 More importantly, Newman was susceptible to 
being viewed as an inflexible rule that created the potential of 
 
130. Newman, 773 F.3d at 442. 
131. Id. at 444. 
132. Id. at 444, 447–50, 454. 
133. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 77 (2d Cir. 2017). 
134. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. 
135.  Id. at 444. 
136. Id. at 452–53. 
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letting “garden variety” tippee insider trading slip through the 
enforcement net.137 This would be on the majority’s mind very 
much in the Martoma cases. 
Why the court felt compelled to go beyond the language of Dirks 
on the personal benefit rule is a fair question. Intellectual 
underpinnings aside, the decision was jarring especially because of 
the Second Circuit’s long history of accepting the government’s view 
of insider trading. Dorozhko certainly underscores this point.138 In 
that case, the high standard of proof necessary to sustain a criminal 
conviction—not to mention the severe consequences of a 
conviction—were clearly on the court’s mind. In this regard, two 
commentators noted, “it is more likely the Newman court was 
influenced by its view that the government’s efforts to prosecute 
remote tippees was a ‘doctrinal novelty,’” and as a result construed 
the friends-relative inference narrowly.139 In a similar vein, as one 
admirer of Newman has put it, the court sought to establish 
“brighter lines to cabin prosecutorial and SEC discretion in 
bringing future criminal and civil insider trading actions.”140 The 
same can probably be said for the strengthening of Dirks’ 
knowledge requirement. Simply put, the court concluded that the 
government went too far with its view of tippee liability. 
The Newman court’s opinion reveals its sensibility to the 
impact of tippee liability on the securities industry. The opinion’s 
gloss over the personal benefit rule acknowledges, at least 
implicitly, that the mere filing of an insider trading case puts 
defendants at great financial risk, irrespective of the outcome once 
the law is applied. Moreover, the specter of enforcement actions 
can have a chilling effect on the flow of important information 
concerning issuers that is critical to the securities market and the 
lifeblood of the securities industry.141 
In sum, Newman created a narrow two-part requirement for 
establishing personal benefit in the context of gift-giving between 
friends, which made the government’s evidentiary burden much 
greater, even in cases that did not involve remote tippees.142 The 
 
137. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 77; Patel & Galloway, supra note 42, at 5. 
138. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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Martoma cases would prove to be just such a case. Going back to 
the critical stakeholder analysis, the securities industry received a 
narrow legal rule in the area of tippee liability. 
Not surprisingly, the government did not receive the decision 
favorably,143 and as the Martoma cases revealed, it was unpopular 
within the Second Circuit.144 The SEC characterized the decision 
as greatly limiting its ability to prosecute “the most common, 
culpable, and market-threatening forms of insider trading.”145 
Perhaps something of an exaggeration, but the United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York dropped seven 
insider trading charges because of Newman and threatened to move 
prosecutions outside the Second Circuit.146 
The government’s petition for its rehearing and, eventually, its 
writ of certiorari, were denied.147 The writ was most likely denied 
because there was no clear circuit split on the requirements for 
establishing a personal benefit. This would soon change, however. 
C. Salman: Newman’s Pecuniary or Similar Value Requirement 
Eliminated 
In United States v. Salman, the Ninth Circuit was faced with 
an appeal of a tippee insider trading conviction based on Newman’s 
“meaningfully close personal relationship” gloss on the personal 
benefit rule.148 
Salman traded while he was in possession of MNPI that he 
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obtained from an investment banker.149 The tipper investment 
banker shared the information with his brother-in-law who not only 
traded on it, but also shared it with his friend, Salman, who also 
happened to be the tipper’s brother-in-law.150 Unlike in Newman, 
the evidence produced at trial revealed that the tipper and tippee 
had a “very close” friend-relative relationship.151 As such, Salman 
had a weak defense under Dirks. The MNPI was a gift to a trading 
relative who clearly knew that the tipper received a personal 
benefit from the exchange of MNPI.152 For this reason (and others), 
Salman was convicted.153 
Newman was decided while Salman’s appeal from his 
conviction was pending before the Ninth Circuit, and he relied on 
that case to provide a basis for reversal. He essentially argued that 
the tipper did not receive a pecuniary gain or something of similar 
value from the exchange of the MNPI; hence there was no personal 
benefit.154 In other words, merely giving of gift of MNPI to a 
trading relative or friend was not enough to support an inference of 
personal benefit. 
Interestingly, Judge Jed Saul Rakoff, a Senior United States 
District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, was 
sitting by designation on the Ninth Circuit. He was assigned the 
opinion in Salman. Judge Rakoff, writing for a unanimous court, 
concluded that Dirks allowed the jury to infer that the tipper 
breached a duty because he made “a gift of [MNPI] to a trading 
relative.”155 To the extent that Newman went further and required 
additional gain to the tipper in cases involving gifts of MNPI to 
family and friends, the Ninth Circuit “decline[d] to follow it.”156 
Central to the court’s holding was its concern that a loophole would 
be created if tips were lawful simply because the tipper did not ask 
for “tangible compensation in return.”157 
The Supreme Court was now faced with a clear conflict 
between two important Circuits, which paved the way for Salman 
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to make it to the Court. As previously mentioned, the Supreme 
Court had not taken up an insider trading case in almost twenty 
years.158 In a narrow decision, the Court, relying heavily on Dirks, 
unanimously affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision.159 Tellingly, 
the Court concluded that the case was “easily” decided by Dirks.160 
The Court reasoned that giving a gift of trading information is 
the same as the tipper trading and then gifting the proceeds.161 
However, the Court rejected the SEC’s expansive view that a gift of 
MNPI to anyone, not just a trading relative or friend, is enough to 
prove securities fraud.162 This is important because it reveals the 
Court’s reluctance to take an expansive view of insider trading 
simply because it is unfair, which the Court made explicit.163 
Similarly, the Court did not seem impressed with the government’s 
argument that “Salman’s concerns about unlimited and 
indeterminate liability for remote tippees [was] significantly 
alleviated by other statutory elements that prosecutors must 
satisfy to convict a tippee for insider trading.”164 The majority in 
Martoma II, however, would be more receptive to the government’s 
argument.165 
The Salman opinion reflects a recognition that limits need to 
be placed on insider trading law as it applies to tippees lest it sweep 
too broadly by not providing reasonably clear guidelines. To this 
point, the Court stated that Dirks provided a “simple and clear 
‘guiding principle’” for determining tippee liability in the context of 
gift-giving to close friends and relatives that was neither uncertain 
nor indeterminate.166 As such, the Court was wholly consistent 
with the underlying limiting principle in Dirks. In this regard, the 
Salman Court concluded that under the facts of the case at bar, that 
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principle was not weakened.167 Stated another way, the securities 
industry had clear guidelines for at least this aspect of insider 
trading. The Court rejected only one of the requirements for 
establishing personal benefit under Newman: the “pecuniary or of 
similarly valuable nature” requirement.168 
Although the Court rejected part of Newman, it left intact the 
need for a “meaningfully close personal relationship” to form the 
basis for an objective inquiry as to what constitutes personal 
benefit.169 The Court did not address the issue because it was not 
argued and, in any event, under any definition of the term, the 
tipper-tippee relationship before the Court was a close one, and it 
was discussed at some length.170 Also, the Court did not disturb 
Newman’s gloss on the knowledge requirement, as it was not before 
the Court. 
D. United States v. Martoma: The Second Circuit’s Attempts to 
Clarify the Personal Benefit Rule 
1. Martoma I171 
The Salman Court did not intend to answer every question on 
tippee liability, but it did provide clarity concerning one aspect of 
the personal benefit rule. Truth be known, the pecuniary or similar 
value requirement of Newman was not supported by the language 
of Dirks, and its demise was not surprising. In Martoma I, the 
Second Circuit concluded that further clarification of the personal 
benefit rule was necessary.172 In the process, the court drastically 
altered what was left of Newman relative to the personal benefit 
rule. 
To remain chronologically organized, Newman came down 
after Martoma’s conviction and Salman was decided shortly after 
the Martoma I court heard oral argument on Martoma’s appeal.173 
While none of this was intentional, it certainly complicated matters. 
In Martoma I, Martoma was a senior trader and portfolio 
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manager for a major hedge fund, S.A.C. Capital Advisors (SAC), 
which—along with its owner and manager, the infamous and highly 
successful, Steven Cohen—had been under investigation for insider 
trading.174 In 2016, the government “blinked” at filing a criminal 
proceeding against Cohen for insider trading, but settled for a 
major civil fine and certain industry restrictions.175 This 
background provides insight into the importance of the case for the 
court and for the government’s unflagging determination to convict 
Martoma and other remote tippees who were members of the 
securities industry. While the case meant little to the public at 
large, it was a big deal for Wall Street.176 
Martoma’s conviction stemmed from an insider trading scheme 
involving securities of two pharmaceutical companies.177 In short, 
he cultivated a relationship with two prominent doctors who were 
involved with a clinical trial for an Alzheimer drug that was 
developed jointly by two companies.178 The doctors passed on 
publicly unavailable information to Martoma about the unfavorable 
results of the drug’s testing.179 One of the doctors passed on the 
critical information at two separate meetings.180 Armed with this 
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information, the hedge fund reduced its positions in the two 
companies, and entered into short sales and other measures that 
would be highly profitable when the companies’ share prices fell. 
Not surprisingly, the companies’ share prices fell when the results 
of the drug trial were announced.181   SAC obtained approximately 
$283 million in avoided losses and profits.182   Martoma received  a 
$9 million bonus in large part for his efforts.183 Because Newman 
had yet to be decided, the jury instructions took an expansive view 
of what the government needed to prove to establish personal 
benefit, and they did not mention the “meaningfully close personal 
relationship” requirement.184 
Martoma challenged the sufficiency of the jury instructions and 
the evidence. In short, he argued that his conviction should be 
reversed under Newman because Salman did not overrule 
Newman’s requirement that a tipper have a “meaningfully close 
personal relationship” with a tippee to support the inference that 
the tipper received a personal benefit from his gift of inside 
information.185 In support of his contention, Martoma argued that 
he had a casual relationship with the doctor who provided him with 
the information.186 He also argued that the doctor was not paid for 
the meetings that produced the critical information.187 Martoma 
did not advance the tangible value requirement of Newman because 
Salman stripped it away.188 Martoma also did not press the 
knowledge requirement of Newman, which would have been a weak 
argument anyway given that he was not a remote tippee.189 
It is important to stop to reflect on what the court faced from 
an ad hominem perspective. While tippee insider trading may be 
difficult to define, Martoma’s conduct certainly looked like insider 
trading by any common sense understanding of the term, and his 
conduct was certainly manifestly unfair to other investors who did 
not have the information.190 Moreover, it is clear that the court was 
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aware of Cohen’s role.191 However, Newman’s “meaningfully close 
personal relationship” requirement stood in the way of Martoma’s 
conviction absent evidence of a quid pro quo arrangement.192 
Equally important, what was left of Newman imperiled the 
conviction of “future Martomas.”193 All of this could not have been 
lost on the court at some level, and it was certainly not lost on the 
government. 
Thus, the court was faced with a damning set of facts and had 
no statutory guidance as to what constituted tippee insider 
trading—other than the requirement that the trading on the MNPI 
must involve fraud.194 Dirks was controlling Supreme Court case 
law that the court could hardly overrule.195 Still, Dirks left 
sufficient room for the court to determine “the appropriate way to 
determine when there is a personal benefit in the absence of a 
financial benefit.”196 
Newman presented a more difficult problem because it was 
recent Second Circuit precedent, and it appeared to leave less room 
for interpretation than Dirks. Between both the original and 
amended decisions, the court crafted a rule that basically nullified 
Newman’s relationship requirement. In short, the majority in 
Martoma I took a broad approach to the personal benefit rule, 
whereas the dissent adhered to the narrow approach in 
Newman.197 
None of the judges who were on the panels in the Martoma 
cases participated in Newman, which probably has more to do with 
timing than anything else. Two members of the panel, however, 
clearly were not enamored with Newman.198 The court affirmed 
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the convictions over Judge Rosemary S. Pooler’s spirited forty-four- 
page dissent.199 In the process, the court did two things. First, it 
concluded that based on the “ongoing relationship” between 
Martoma and the tipper who provided the critical information, the 
jury could infer the essential elements of tippee insider trading, 
including a sufficient personal benefit for the tipper, under a 
“pecuniary quid pro quo theory” of Dirks.200 
Second, and more controversially, the majority acknowledged 
that Salman did not explicitly reject the “meaningfully close 
personal relationship requirement,” and concluded that Salman 
provided a basis for abrogating Newman’s relationship test.201 
Specifically, the majority concluded that “the straightforward logic 
of the gift-giving analysis in Dirks, strongly reaffirmed in Salman, 
is that a corporate insider personally benefits whenever he 
‘disclos[es] inside information as a gift . . . with the expectation that 
[the recipient] would trade’ on the basis of such information ”202 
In the majority’s mind, that was the case “because such a disclosure 
is the functional equivalent of [the tipper] trading on the 
information himself and giving a cash gift to the recipient.”203 Put 
differently, the court stated that giving MNPI to a tippee, with the 
expectation that he or she will trade on it, is presumed to be a gift 
for purposes of the personal benefit rule.204 Critical to the 
majority’s holding was that it applied only to an insider who shares 
MNPI with someone who “he expects will trade on the 
information.”205 In other words, the majority was not crafting a 
rule that deemed gift-giving in every context to be a personal 
benefit. 
Before going further, it is important to reflect briefly on the 
implication of the holding. The Martoma I court replaced 
Newman’s narrow rule with a broader rule that swept within its 
ambit not only Martoma’s conduct, but also that of Chiasson and 
Newman, as well as lesser forms of trading on MNPI, the latter of 
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which arguably would not be captured under Dirks. As such, in a 
very subtle way, the majority may have been signaling that Dirks 
was no longer relevant.206 The impetus for this may very well be 
that the current practices of the securities industry had “out grown” 
what the Supreme Court faced in Dirks.207 In other words, 
technological advances made the exchange of MNPI between 
insiders and market analysts more sophisticated.208 
The court’s holding in Martoma I shifted the focus for personal 
benefit from the relationship between the tipper and tippee to the 
tipper’s intent.209 The majority “closed the deal” by concluding that 
Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement 
was no longer good law.210 And, according to the majority, this was 
all accomplished in accordance with Dirks. In the process, the court 
stripped away an important layer of the government’s evidentiary 
burden, and instead replaced it with a broad and subjective inquiry 
that greatly reduced the government’s evidentiary burden. 
In the eyes of Judge Pooler, the “majority’s opinion exactly 
mirrors the government’s view pressed in Salman: that ‘a gift of 
confidential information to anyone, not just a “trading relative or 
friend,” is enough to prove securities fraud.’”211 She went on to 
state, “[i]n holding that someone who gives a gift always receives a 
personal benefit from doing so, the majority strips the long- 
standing personal benefit rule of its limiting power.”212 
Judge Pooler disagreed with the majority for other important 
reasons, but it is fair to trace her ultimate position to her view of 
Dirks’ limiting principle, which was not shared by the majority.213 
One commentator accurately summarized the thrust of Judge 
Pooler’s argument by noting that in the context of the majority’s 
holding, “the risk of sweeping in ‘innocent’ conduct is far greater, 
and the corresponding need for clear boundaries more acute     ”214 
Judge Pooler was willing to make a trade-off that the majority was 
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unwilling to make. In this regard, she implicitly referred to the 
very market professionals that the Dirks Court sought to protect 
from overreach with the personal benefit rule. 
Frankly, getting one’s arm around Dirks and Salman is 
infinitely easier than trying to parse through the logic of Martoma 
I. The above discussion does not do justice to either opinion. In any 
event, Martoma I was remarkable for at least four reasons. 
First, the government achieved a result that it was previously 
denied of in Newman and Salman.215 This illustrates the 
government’s relentlessness in pursuing insider trading in any 
form with an expansive view of the law, even after getting “smacked 
down” by prior decisions.216 
Second, the majority overruled Newman without the benefit of 
an en banc hearing, contrary to Second Circuit precedent.217 The 
majority acknowledged this but justified its action by stating that a 
three-judge panel can overrule circuit precedent “‘where an 
intervening Supreme Court decision casts doubt on the prior 
ruling.’”218 In other words, the court was merely following the lead 
of the Court in Salman, although, as Judge Pooler rightly pointed 
out in her dissent—and as the majority implicitly acknowledged on 
rehearing—it was too great a stretch to conclude that Salman “cast 
doubt” by any reasonable measure on Newman’s relationship 
requirement.219 
Third, it is not entirely unclear why the majority felt compelled 
to go as far as it did, unless it was nothing more than a desire to 
take the opportunity to gut a decision that the majority—and 
possibly other judges on the Circuit—concluded went too far.220 
Arguably, Martoma’s conviction could have been upheld on a quid 
pro quo basis in view of the fact that one of the tippers received at 
least a $70,000 consulting fee, which formed the basis for the 
amended decision, and thus avoided the issue of the “meaningfully 
close personal relationship” requirement.221 Additionally, Salman 
implicitly left the “meaningfully close personal relationship” 
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requirement intact.222 The Supreme Court did not consider the 
issue it would have been a significant stretch for the majority to 
argue that Salman provided any support for its analysis. 
Finally, the Martoma I court dramatically undercut the 
limiting principle of Dirks with the subjective intent to benefit 
standard, which was more clearly stated in the amended 
decision.223 In so doing, the majority ostensibly adhered to Dirks. 
In reality, however, the majority arguably casted doubt on the 
viability of Dirks. 
In sum, Martoma I replaced Newman’s enhanced relationship 
requirement with what appeared to be the subjective intent to 
benefit standard.224 In doing so, the court effectively removed an 
important evidentiary layer of the government’s case. In the 
process, the scales were decidedly tipped in the favor of the 
government, much to the consternation of the securities industry. 
However, the Second Circuit was not done attempting to clarify the 
personal benefit rule. 
2. Martoma II225 
After the court issued its decision, Martoma successfully 
petitioned the court for a rehearing.226 The gravamen of his 
argument on rehearing was that the jury’s instructions ran afoul of 
Newman by allowing the jury to find that a tipper receives a 
personal benefit from gifting inside information even where the 
tipper and tippee do not have a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship.”227 
Here is where things get more curious. The court sustained the 
conviction but on different grounds from the original case. 
Basically, the court acknowledged that the jury instructions were 
inconsistent with Newman, not because they omitted the term 
“meaningfully close personal relationship,” but because they 
allowed the jury to convict solely on the evidence of a friendship 
without requiring a quid pro quo relationship or an intent by the 
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tipper to benefit the tippee.228 At the same time, the majority made 
it clear that there was no need to instruct the jury on the “gift 
theory” because the jury could also find a personal benefit based on 
the intent to benefit standard.229 
Interestingly, the majority opinion is devoid of any reference to 
the securities industry, as was the case in Dirks and even Newman. 
Moreover, the majority did not trouble itself with analyzing how the 
intent to benefit standard was consistent with Dirks’ limiting 
principle other than to point out, as it did in the original opinion, 
that a prerequisite for personal benefit is that the tipper has an 
expectation that the tippee will trade on the MNPI. 
The court went on to hold that the error did not affect 
Martoma’s substantial rights because the government presented 
compelling evidence that at least one tipper shared a relationship, 
thus suggesting a quid pro quo with Martoma.230 That relationship 
was the $70,000 consulting fee that was paid to one of the doctors, 
which was in evidence at the trial and arguably could have ended 
the inquiry in the original case.231 
The majority focused extensively on the intent to benefit 
language contained in its original decision as a means to satisfy the 
“meaningfully close relationship” requirement in the gift-giving 
context. The majority concluded that its view was consistent with 
Dirks, and essentially that “additional evidence of the tippee-tipper 
relationship” is not required in every case for a personal benefit to 
exist.232 
In effect, the Martoma II court reversed its prior ruling that 
abrogated Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” 
requirement, and added an alternate basis for establishing 
personal benefit based on the intent of the gift-giver, which it found 
to be consistent with the Newman requirement and, by implication, 
with Dirks.233 In an about face, the majority acknowledged that it 
did not need to decide whether Newman’s requirement was 
inconsistent with Salman.234 
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In sum, as one commentator succinctly put it, “the majority 
read Newman to require evidence of a personal benefit to the tipper, 
which can be established through either evidence of a meaningfully 
close or quid pro quo relationship between the tipper and tippee or 
evidence that the tipper intended to benefit the tippee by sharing 
[MNPI].”235 It is hard to imagine any set of facts that could trigger 
the application of the “meaningfully close personal relationship” 
requirement and yet not be addressed by the lesser intent to benefit 
standard. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the majority embraced 
Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement 
while effectively rendering it meaningless as a practical matter.236 
Indeed, Newman was replaced with a test that effectively only 
required the government to adduce evidence that MNPI was 
intentionally disclosed by a tipper with the expectation that the 
tippee would trade on it.237 
One can only speculate about the majority’s state of mind from 
a tactical perspective. Perhaps the majority was “providing a basis” 
for denying an en banc petition by reaffirming Newman’s 
relationship requirement and also concluding that even under 
Newman, “the personal benefit test is met when a tipper gifts inside 
information with the intention to benefit the tippee.”238 Another 
entirely plausible but less Machiavellian suggestion is that the 
majority did not have a hidden agenda and simply recognized that 
they made a mistake in the original decision and wanted to get the 
law “right” the second time around, irrespective of the potential for 
an en banc hearing. Simply put, the Second Circuit may have been 
tired of struggling over the personal benefit rule. In any event, the 
en banc petition was denied. 
The court’s holding in Martoma II concerning the newly 
introduced intent to benefit standard ultimately came down to its 
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textual reading of a single sentence in Dirks.239 There is little value 
in relaying the analysis here because it is difficult to parse and the 
majority acknowledged that it was ambiguous.240 Suffice it to say, 
the majority interpreted the sentence as stating that the intent to 
benefit is a stand-alone personal benefit under Dirks.241 According 
to the dissent, the correct interpretation of the sentence is that the 
intention to benefit requires proof of “a relationship between the 
insider and the recipient that suggests . . . an intention to benefit 
the particular [tippee].”242 
It is not unusual for judges to interpret language differently. 
For purposes of this Article, the important point is that the 
majority’s interpretation lends itself to an inherently subjective 
analysis by the fact finder, whereas the dissent’s interpretation 
requires an objective analysis and, by definition, is narrower 
because evidence of the requisite close relationship needs to be 
established. 
The implications of this divergence in views is important for 
defendants caught up in the web of insider trading laws. Under the 
majority view, the government can establish personal benefit with 
evidence of the tipper’s intent, and it is not required to provide 
evidence of the tipper-tippee relationship in every case.243 As such, 
the majority removed—if not greatly stripped away—the 
substantiality provided by Newman’s “meaningfully close personal 
relationship” test.244 
The dissent’s view pivots off the limiting principle of Dirks. 
Judge Pooler stated that “[r]estricting proof of a personal benefit to 
objective evidence avoids turning the rule into a mere formality.”245 
Like the majority in Dirks, it appears that Judge Pooler was 
concerned that insider trading laws could sweep too broadly and 
ensnare “legitimate” market participants in its web.246 She was 
especially concerned that prosecutors could commence enforcement 
proceedings based on scant objective evidence.247 Judge Pooler was 
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fighting to preserve the heart of Newman, that is, the need to 
establish clearer boundaries around government discretion and 
prosecution.248 
While one can debate who got it right from a doctrinal 
perspective, it is clear is that Martoma II essentially replaced 
Newman’s objective relationship standard with the subjective 
intent to benefit standard.249 In the process, the Martoma’s of the 
world were given one less avenue to escape insider trading liability. 
However, market analysts and other securities industry 
professionals now faced greater prosecutorial risk if they traded on 
MNPI that was originally disclosed with the expectation that the 
recipient would trade on the information. 
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF MARTOMA AND NEWMAN 
For illustration purposes, the difference between the inquiry 
under the Martoma cases and Newman is illustrated by the 
following (slightly edited) hypothetical and discussion provided by 
Gregory Morvillo, a well-known securities defense lawyer who 
represented Newman along with other lawyers.250 
Suppose a junior corporate official, who is relatively new to her 
job, reveals more about her company than she should, knowing that 
the investment professional is going to trade because that is what 
investment professionals often do. Morvillo posits that under the 
Martoma cases, her conduct could be considered insider trading; 
but under Newman, it would not. He goes on to flesh out his 
conclusions as follows: 
The Martoma cases ask the following: (1) was the disclosure 
intentional? (Answer: yes); (2) did the insider have an expectation 
the recipient was going to trade? (Answer: yes); (3) could this be 
considered a gift? (Answer: yes, because what is a gift but the 
intentional giving of information without an expectation of 
something in return.) Thus, under the Martoma cases, both parties 
could be convicted of insider trading. 
Newman asks the following: (1) was the disclosure intentional? 
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(Answer: yes); (2) did the insider have an expectation the recipient 
was going to trade? (Answer: yes); (3) could this be considered a gift 
to a trading relative or friend? (Answer: no, the relationship did 
not rise to the level of a “meaningfully close personal relationship,” 
because the relationship was not of the nature or kind where one 
party would commit fraud and give the other a gift of potentially 
millions of dollars. In the real world, that only happens when the 
tipper and tippee have a very close relationship.)251 
In any event, Morvillo acknowledges that there may be 
circumstances where the investor relations person and analyst may 
be convicted of insider trading.252 However, his concern, like that 
of Judge Pooler, is that Martoma II sweeps too broadly.253 Each 
would advocate “close” cases slipping the net of tippee liability, 
whereas the majority in Martoma II casted a wider net. 
This takes us full circle. The majority was unwilling to let 
people like Martoma slip through the narrow net cast by the court 
in Newman. Judge Pooler—while she personally may have found 
Martoma’s actions abhorrent and certainly unfair—was not willing 
to subscribe to a rule that could ensnare securities professionals 
that were providing legitimate market services.254 
V. SUMMING UP TWO WORLD VIEWS—OR AT LEAST TWO DIFFERENT 
APPROACHES 
Hypotheticals and textual readings of sentences aside, it is 
clear is that the panels in Newman and the Martoma cases took 
different approaches to determining where to draw the boundaries 
of tippee liability in the gift-giving context—one broad, the other 
narrow. What is also clear is that neither the narrow rule of 
Newman nor the broad rule of Martoma is satisfactory to both the 
government and participants in the securities industry.255 Indeed, 
depending on one’s perspective, innocent people may be captured 
by a broad rule and wrongdoers may escape under a narrower rule. 
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There does not appear to be any middle ground. 
Everyone knows that insider trading is fundamentally unfair, 
but defining what constitutes insider trading in the world of 
information sharing between providers and recipients in the 
securities industry is difficult. Section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 prohibit 
fraud, not unfairness per se. The generality of section 10(b)/rule 
10b-5 coupled with the lack of clear guidance from Congress 
(assuming that is even possible), means that the courts will have to 
draw the line. Courts should strive to connect their holdings to 
doctrine, and remain cognizant of the fact that serious 
consequences will result from where the lines are drawn. The 
Second Circuit made three attempts in three years at crafting a 
rule, and it struggled in the process.256 While some of the Circuit’s 
angst may be attributable to miscalculations on doctrine that 
needed correcting, it is arguable that the subject of insider trading 
simply does not lend itself to a neat analysis, as it is amorphous and 
confusing. Additionally, although the Martoma II majority may 
have regarded Dirks as outdated, it was “stuck” with that decision 
and had to navigate its way through it as best it could. 
The question of who got it right is unanswerable because the 
underlying law of insider trading in the context of tippee liability 
does not lend itself to a neat analytical framework. It is fair to 
argue that the majority and the dissent in Martoma II were both 
right and wrong. There is no “one size fits all” answer, which 
lawyers and academics have pursued since time immemorial. 
Stated another way, the only right answer is the answer provided 
by the court that issues the final decision. And for now, that is the 
Martoma cases. 
Boiling down the different views of the majorities and the 
dissents in the Martoma cases on the standard of evidence 
necessary to infer a personal benefit to whether tippee liability 
should be narrow or broad may be too simplistic for many. It would 
be gross speculation to conclude, for example, that Judge Pooler 
takes a narrow view of insider trading in general. But it is clear 
that, based on her dissent in Martoma II, she at least believes it has 
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its limitations.257 The same can probably be said for the Newman 
court. On the other hand, the approach of the majority opinions in 
the Martoma cases appear to have taken an approach more 
consistent with the Second Circuit’s historically expansive view of 
the reach of insider trading law. In this sense, it is fair to argue 
that the majority regarded Newman as an outlier in Second Circuit 
insider trading jurisprudence, and what remained after Salman 
needed to be set aside. 
Whether the majority and dissent started with different “world 
views” that dictated the outcomes is unclear. What is clear is that, 
at a foundational level, the majority and dissenting opinions in the 
Martoma cases reflect divergent views—which have drastically 
different consequences—as to the reach of insider trading law in 
the context of tippee liability. 
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARTOMA CASES AND OTHER 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Unless the Supreme Court takes the case up, which appears 
especially unlikely because there is no discernable split in the 
circuits, Martoma II stands as the law today in the Second Circuit. 
Interestingly, in criminal cases, the government can avoid the 
personal benefit rule entirely, though it has not used that power 
often. Regardless, after the Martoma cases, the government’s 
evidentiary burden in gifting cases has been greatly eased and its 
prosecutorial discretion widened, which has important 
consequences for the securities industry.258 Also, the SEC has the 
authority to bring civil insider trading cases in its administrative 
law courts, which it has increasingly done since the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act expanded the 
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universe of defendants that may be sued in administrative 
proceedings, and the available remedies.259 
What we do know is that after the Martoma cases, the 
government’s evidentiary burden in gifting cases has been greatly 
eased and its prosecutorial discretion widened, which has 
important consequences for the securities industry. Salman ended 
the tangible value requirement of Newman.260 It is debatable 
whether the “meaningfully close personal relationship” 
requirement has disappeared entirely by virtue of the Martoma 
cases, although Judge Pooler and Martoma’s lawyers appear to 
believe it has.261 In any event, the requirement has been 
significantly mitigated and, as the majority pointed out, the bar to 
prove personal benefit is now relatively low. It will be interesting 
to see what courts outside the Second Circuit do with the Martoma 
cases, if anything. 
Remote tippees can take some solace from the fact that Salman 
and the Martoma cases left largely untouched the second 
requirement of Newman, which requires the government to 
introduce concrete evidence that the tippee knew (or did not avoid 
knowing) of the personal benefit.262 At first blush, this appears to 
be a fairly heavy burden. This may explain why the United States 
Attorney did not indict some of the “remote” tippees in the Collins 
case.263 Newman-like remote tippees can take solace from this, 
provided that the Second Circuit does not water down the 
knowledge requirement in light of the fact that the “meaningfully 
close personal relationship” requirement has been essentially 
jettisoned. But that remains to be seen. Indeed, based on the 
government’s track record in insider trading cases, it will likely 
attempt to chip away at Newman’s knowledge requirement in 
future cases. 
While Newman, Salman, and the Martoma cases involved 
criminal prosecutions, the doctrine that has emerged from these 
cases applies equally to civil proceedings, especially with the 
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different burden of proof, which presents an interesting question 
that will be left to others to explore further.264 All indications are, 
however, that the doctrine applies to civil cases.265 While the 
Agency might dispute it, it has a decided “home court advantage” 
in terms of the legal basis for tippee liability, which only increased 
by virtue of the Martoma cases. 
Finally, there is an obvious lesson to be learned here for 
participants in the securities industry. The Martoma cases greatly 
increased the risks for participants who trade on MNPI. Firms and 
individuals who chose to place their faith in the government and 
the courts to protect them from insider trading prosecutions may 
find themselves sadly disappointed. Compliance programs that are 
aimed at detecting and preventing securities law violations will 
certainly need to be adjusted for insiders and recipients of MNPI in 
order to account for the broad tippee liability standard established 
in the Martoma cases.266 
The guidance to insiders is fairly straightforward: do not 
communicate MPNI to anyone outside the company, especially if 
the insider is deriving some personal benefit from the 
communication, such as providing a Christmas gift to the doorman 
or the plumber in lieu of payment for services rendered. The 
potential liability and costs of such action are too high. In reality, 
it is more complicated than this for many market professionals who 
thrive on information, especially for traders who will want to know 
“exactly” what is legal after the Martoma cases and what is not. 
In the author’s experience, when it comes to preventing 
violations of federal securities law, well-crafted and enforced 
compliance programs are hardly fool proof, but if they are 
meaningful, they can help to mitigate penalties directed at firms. 
In any event, the financial pressures inherent in the securities 
industry remain unaffected by the Martoma cases. The means to 
achieve financial reward have been affected, and at least made 
riskier. It will be interesting to see whether the Martoma cases 
have a material impact on information sharing and trading 
practices in the Second Circuit and elsewhere. In any event, insider 
trading law for tippers and tippees is now a more dangerous trap 
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for the blind or unwary, as Representative Christopher Collins and 
his co-defendants are poignantly aware of now. 
CONCLUSION 
In Newman and the Martoma cases, the Second Circuit 
struggled to define tippee liability, but they dealt with a law that 
does not lend itself to the clear drawing of lines. Having said this, 
Salman took care of the unnecessary overreach by the Newman 
court on the pecuniary/tangible benefit requirement. The Martoma 
cases initially overreached by rejecting the “meaningfully close 
personal relationship” requirement based on Salman, and then 
complicated matters worse by reinstating the relationship 
requirement and retaining its intent to benefit standard. Over the 
course of three years, the underlying rule within the law of tippee 
liability broadened dramatically, which undoubtedly caused great 
uncertainty and confusion in the securities industry and the 
government. 
Further, the Newman court and Judge Pooler approached 
tippee insider trading from a narrow perspective, whereas  the 
majorities in the Martoma cases approached it from a broad 
perspective.267 Whether each started from the premise that insider 
trading law should be narrowly or broadly construed is largely 
beside the point. What is important, however, is where the Second 
Circuit ended up, at least for now, and how it struggled to get there. 
For now, Martoma’s relaxed subjective standard for 
determining personal benefit is the law in the Second Circuit, and 
along with that comes a likelihood of more insider trading 
prosecutions. Naivety aside, one would think the government 
should be cautious about opening the floodgates in light of Dirks’ 
limiting principle. This does not mean that participants in the 
securities industry who are paying attention to the Martoma cases 
should not be unnerved. Rather, they should be concerned because 
the government has broad discretion over when to bring 
enforcement actions, and that power was bolstered by the demise of 
Newman’s personal benefit requirements. This is the legacy of the 
Martoma cases, irrespective of what one thinks of the decision. 
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